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ABSTRACT
In response to increased annual wildfire destruction and insufficient wildfire
mitigation approaches from the federal government, the state of California adopted Public
Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291 in the year 1991. These laws force the removal
of fire-causing agents from public and private areas, and establish what is known as
defensible space. Defensible space is defined in Section 4291 as the area within the
perimeter of a parcel, development, neighborhood, or community where basic wildland
fire protection practices and measures are implemented, providing the key point of
defense from an approaching wildfire or escaping structure fire.
One method to successfully establish these areas of defensible space is by
educating the public about the dangers, causes, and fuel sources of wildfires. Countylevel public outreach programs known as Fire Safe Councils encourage cooperation
within the public sector in regards to state wildfire legislation by publishing fire
information and risk-related maps and by conducting prescribed burns which alleviate
dead, fire-fueling debris in forests. Local Council chapters are composed of over sixty
public and private organizations in and beyond California.
Forty-eight of California’s fifty-eight counties have at least one Fire Safe Council.
Ten have none. In an attempt to gain insight into what accounts for variation, a total of
twelve independent variables concerning socioeconomics and wildfire hazard rating
(risk) were constructed to represent each county. Data was collected from various
sources and inputted into the statistical modeling program, SPSS, for testing.
Out of the five categories of independent variables; population, economic,
education, civic participation, and hazard rating, only variables within the population and
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economic categories were determined to have any significant associations with decisions
to establish Fire Safe Councils. The results of this study thereby set the stage for changes
to be made in current wildfire mitigation, namely, a reevaluation of hazard models and
Sections 4290 and 4291.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
The year 2002 marked the next to worst year of fire destruction in the United States over
the past five decades. Over seven million acres of forest and low-lying chaparral were burned
(www.nfpa.org/NFPAJournal/Covers/Edge/Edge.asp.), predominantly in dry areas of the West.
In June, on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation in Arizona, the Rodeo and Chedeski fires united
to produce the Southwest’s worst fire to that time. This fire burned 468,000 acres, evacuating
32,000 people (www.nfpa.org/JournalArchive/Archives). Later that same year, the Hayman Fire
in Colorado, one of the largest in the state’s history, grew from 100 to 20,000 acres in a single
day. In August, the Bryant Fire swept through California, ravaging over $2.5 million worth of
private property and natural resources located in regions dense with brush and pine
(www.monolithic.com/gallery/homes/braswell_fire/monolithic.com).
Catastrophic fires continued well into 2003, and in October of that year, California saw
some of the worst environmental destruction in the history of the state. News reports routinely
included news of fires killing fifteen to twenty people in the course of a single day, forcing
upwards of 50,000 people from their homes, darkening over 200,000 acres with soot and ash,
causing billions of dollars worth of damages, and pushing insurance claims into the hundreds of
billions of dollars (http://twm.co.nz/Calfires.html#LA%20Fires). Mudslides, flooding, and large
blazes joining together into a single force claimed the attention of tens of thousands of firefighter
personnel per day, as well as emergency and rescue aircraft from several states at a time.
These are but a few instances of a large, ongoing wildfire problem in the United States
which spans several disciplines, including: politics, public risk perception, environmental
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policy, and property rights. Once a completely natural occurrence, responsible for death and
regeneration within ecosystems, wildfires have turned disastrous in the face of human
development and settlement. Particularly hazardous areas of growth are discussed in the
following section.
Surface Fires
As communities grow in and around fire-prone areas, the threat of life loss and property
loss increases. These high-risk areas of development are widely known as the wildland/urban
interface, the focus of much current wildfire mitigation and policy. When communities build,
impermeable surfaces such as asphalt, concrete, and cement increase in area. In many areas of
the West, land surfaces are flat, so drainage to large coulee systems must be rapid so that towns
and cities do not flood. The coulees effectively take what little rainfall the arid regions of the
West receive and transplant it directly to the ocean. The ground becomes deprived of moisture,
and the fire-starting capacity of the region increases.
Although America’s wildfires have been amplified by a multitude of both human and
non-human factors, they are nothing new to man. Wildfires have been shaping the geography,
wildlife, watersheds, soil health, and overall environmental well-being of the North American
continent since before the arrival of the first inhabitants. These pre-settlement fires still occur
naturally, and they are referred to as surface fires.
Surface fires are those which burn undergrowth along the forest floor, claiming shrubbery
before dangerous amounts are allowed to accumulate. Lightning often serves as the impetus to
these natural incidents, but “prescribed burns” also take place in which forest underbrush is set
afire manually. This is a relatively new practice in the United States, not adopted until the early
20th century. Prior to this, all wildfires were extinguished to the extent possible, a form of
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universal prevention policy. This “no fire” policy led to irreversible environmental damage in
the form of habitat degradation.
For over a century, saplings were allowed to concentrate in small areas devoid of surface
fires, depriving older trees of nourishment. These areas grew overcrowded with dead limbs, dry
needles, and other organic material, leading to a hotbed of volatile wildfire fuel. Unfortunately,
our shortsightedness has led to the current massive accumulation of underbrush and leaf litter in
our national forests. When abundant fuel sources are combined with human carelessness
(unattended campfires) and environmental variations (weather patterns), irrepressible fires are
often produced.
Surface fires speed up physical and chemical processes in the forest, keeping the
environment healthy and “new.” Nutrients in dead undergrowth, limbs, and litter are liberated in
fires. When fires are not allowed to burn, decomposition and restorative rates are slow. Some
conifers cannot undergo the process of germination at all, much less a speedy process, unless
their cones receive excessive amounts of heat. An alternate way in which surface fires keep the
environment healthy is by killing many of the disease-carrying insects and pathogens found in
parts of the forest.
Succession Relationships
In addition to increasing the frequency and intensity of large fires, the delicate balance of
succession relationships between r-strategist species and k-strategist species have been disrupted
by the “no fires” policy. R-strategist species use what are known as r-patterns of survival. These
species move into an ecosystem quickly, using rapid reproduction for survival in the natural
world (Purves, Orians, Heller, and Sadava, p. 1165). The rapid reproduction rates allow for a
high rate of mobility through the ecosystem, as well as the ability to cover large areas and get
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heavy doses of sunlight. Through these mechanisms, r-strategist species extract resources from
the environment which they convert into energy. Common r-strategists are weeds, insects, and
rodents, and they are found in prairies as well as forests.
K-strategists rely on efficiency in the utilization of natural resources for survival rather
than rapid reproduction. They need much more time to develop, typically staying in one place
and using physical features such as large leaf surface area and complex root structure to gain a
stranglehold on the sunlight and water available in their area. Common k-use organisms are tall
trees found in several types of forest.
The principle of succession, a gradual change from r-strategist to k-strategist, can be
stated thus: if a person tills a patch of land and leaves it unattended for an extended period of
time, there will be gradual changes in the ecosystem through time. First, there will be grasses
and weeds, then small plants and flowers, then small trees and vines, then larger trees. Certain
insects and animals would be present with the plants through each phase of development. A
tilled patch of land usually results in a k-strategist dominant old growth forest, unless other
factors come into play. Surface wildfires are one type of factor that sets the environmental stage
for r-strategist colonization. The fires create and retain space in the canopy, allowing plenty of
much-needed sunlight to the forest floor where it can be utilized by r-strategists.
Although extreme wildfires threaten the survival of a number of species in the American
West, such as red squirrels and spotted owls (http://forests.org), surface fires play a major role in
species preservation, both plant and animal. Natural surface fires thus appear to be a product of
evolution, a method in which Earth maintains balance between r-strategists and k-strategists.
Succession relationships are the product of millions of years of evolution and natural selection,
thus represent an efficient manner of recycling energy through the environment given the
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conditions of Earth at a particular time. The “no fire” policy severely disturbed this natural
balance, setting the stage for wildfire disasters.
Federal Wildfire Policy
Since it is apparent that wildfire mitigation in America has been mismanaged for a long
time due to ignorance in land management practices and policymaking, various attempts are
being made by decision-makers at local, state, and national levels to mitigate the occurrence of
these disasters. This section focuses on wildfire policy at the federal level. Subsequent sections
address the state and local levels, the primary areas of concern in respect to this research.
In August 2002, the United States developed its National Fire Plan, a comprehensive
wildfire mitigation and prevention policy. The USDA Forest Service and the U.S. Department
of the Interior have the primary roles in seeing that the fundamental objectives of the Plan are
met each year. These departments work through their agencies to achieve these conditions,
which must be met in accordance with the Plan (http://www.fireplan.gov/overview/whatis.html):
1) Assuring that necessary firefighting resources and personnel are available to respond
to wildland fires which threaten lives and property.
2) Conducting emergency stabilization and rehabilitation activities on landscapes and
communities affected by wildland fire.
3) Reducing hazardous fuels (dry brush and trees that have accumulated and increase the
likelihood of unusually large fires) in the country’s forests and rangelands.
4) Providing assistance to communities that have been or may be threatened by wildland
fire.
5) Committing to the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, an interagency team created to
establish and maintain high standards for wildland fire management on public lands.
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The National Fire Plan offers protection through program grants. Federal funds are used
to conduct prescribed burns, provide forest restoration, provide flood protection, construct
structures referred to as “fuelbreaks” that defend private property from the prescribed burns and
provide other safety precautions meant to accommodate the five National Fire Plan conditions.
Some of these precautions extend to the digital world, such as funding for remote sensing
research, cutting-edge smoke detection, and supersensitive radar. After prolonged study, it
becomes clear that there must be a balance between proactive and reactive wildfire policy,
between pre-fire protection and post-fire damage control. The increased severity and frequency
of wildfires suggests that this balance may be as delicate as the one between succession
relationships in the world’s ecosystems.
Another technique of federal, pre-fire mitigation is public outreach. People who own
and are in charge of both private and public property must understand how fires start, spread, and
worsen. They must understand the fundamentals of overpopulation and the danger of living
close to the wildland urban/interface.
America’s wildfire public outreach programs do not get enough attention from the federal
government. Government spending on fuel reduction is a major step in terms of reducing fire
hazards, but a close examination of current fuel reduction policies is needed. The current
Healthy Forest Initiative is a landmark demonstration of how the federal government is
addressing fire fuel reduction.
President Bush submitted legislation to establish the Healthy Forest Initiative to Congress
in 2002. Its written purpose is to suppress fires and prevent them when possible, to promote
community assistance to areas affected by fires, to restore fire-adapted ecosystems, and to reduce
fuels. Once enacted, the Initiative took the forest fire problems of the Western U.S. and spread
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the cost to all tax-paying Americans. To many environmentalists, Bush’s plan for fire prevention
is indicative of federal politics protecting the logging and timber industry. The Healthy Forest
Initiative is actually a long-term cooperative effort with the USDA Forest Service, Department of
the Interior, and the National Association of State Foresters. It complies with the 1994
Northwest Forest Plan written during the Clinton administration, which was created with the
intent of expanding and intensifying the logging of old growth national forests. Thus, the
Healthy Forest Initiative relieves pressure on the timber industry coming from environmentalists.
Environmentalists have historically taken their demands to ban logging to the courts and have
often seen them upheld due to the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered
Species Act.
Many environmental groups believe that logging in national forests will increase greatly
over the next few years due to the Healthy Forest Initiative, severely undermining the policies of
NEPA. Trees of interest to the timber companies are not cited most often in literature as
constituting the major threat to fire safety. The Firewise Program, sponsored by the NFPA and a
consortium of wildland fire agencies in California, Colorado, and other Western states, explains
to communities within the wildland/urban interface that shrubs, bushes, and dead limbs around
homes are the major threat to public wildfire safety (www.firewise.org).
Many state legislators find problems with federal wildfire policy. They are skeptical of
the Healthy Forest Initiative since increased logging of old growth forests does not reduce
wildfire risk, and they are dissatisfied with the amount of public outreach available to American
citizens. The following section examines what legislators at the state and local levels are doing
to address harmful wildfires.
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State and Local Wildfire Policy
In response to what they deem an inept, status quo approach from the Federal
government, state legislatures have devised their own programs to educate the public and reduce
wildfire hazards. In these states, citizens are educated about the complexities of wildfires and
are encouraged to go beyond what is demanded by federal law to exercise additional precautions
that reduce wildfire risk. While the National Fire Plan is responsible for wildfire fuel reduction
across the nation, the federal departments and agencies are limited in what they can accomplish.
Additionally, the National Fire Plan does not stress fuel reduction on private property. These
circumstances have led California to pass the only laws in the nation that force the removal of
biotic, fire-causing agents on private property. The laws establish what is known as defensible
space.
California Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291 define “defensible space” for
wildfire protection areas of state and local responsibility (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov). These
laws were passed into legislation in 1991. Defensible space in Section 4291 is defined as the
area within the perimeter of a development, neighborhood, or community where basic wildland
fire protection practices are implemented, providing the key point of defense from an
approaching wildfire or escaping structure fire. Section 4291 sets the requirements for
defensible space around trailers, homes, and businesses. Thus, 4291 is designed to maintain
space around structures devoid of potential fire fuels.
In addition to Section 4291, Section 4290 sets various field requirements for on-site water
storage, vegetation clearance, and road access. These laws are meant to guarantee road access
for emergency vehicles and ample civilian evacuation routes. Dead-end roads must be kept to a
minimum, and emergency vehicles must have access to roads sufficiently wide for turnarounds
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while not posing any vertical clearance issues. Neighborhoods must be equipped with clear,
legible street signs for quick conveyance of information. PRC 4290 also contains strict standards
for new housing construction zones, requiring water supplies and hydrant systems to be fully
sufficient for fire protection.
Depending on the size of their property, California homeowners must regulate their
defensible space accordingly. Small patches of trees and shrubs should be surrounded by
greenbelts, irrigated sections of grass or other noncombustible material such as rocks. Dead
limbs, leaves, and ground litter must be routinely removed. Grasses and weeds are kept at low
heights. Branches should be trimmed away from the roof and the rest of the home.
Fire Safe Councils
To get people to comply with these state laws, California has developed county-level
public outreach programs called Fire Safe Councils which seek to demonstrate the importance of
defensible space and greenbelts in wildfire protection. Local chapters are composed of sixty-one
public and private organizations. These organizations are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Members of the Fire Safe Council
Allstate Insurance

Association of
Contract Counties
Bureau of Land
Management

California Department
of Insurance
Firefighters
Association
California Department
of Parks and
Recreation
California Fair Plan
Association
California Farm
Bureau Association

California Air
Resources Board
California Association
of Nurserymen

California Fire Chiefs
Association
California Forest
Products Commission

American Red Cross
American Society of
Landscape Architects

Committee for
Firesafe Dwellings
Council for a Green
Environment
Farmer’s Insurance
Group of Companies

Pacific Gas and
Electric
Personal Insurance
Federation
Planning and
Conservation League

Federal Emergency
Management Agency
Fire Districts
Association of
California
Firewise

Roundup

Firemen’s Fund
Insurance

Safeco Insurance

San Diego Gas and
Electric
Society of American
Foresters
(table continued)
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California Association California Integrated
of Realtors
Waste Management
Board
California Association California Landscape
Contractors
of Resource
Conservation Districts Association

Governor’s Office of
Emergency Services
Insurance Information
Network of California

South Coast Air
Quality Management
District
Southern California
Edison

California Board of
Forestry
California Building
Industry Association

Insurance Services
Offices, Inc.
League of California
Cities Fire Chiefs

State Farm Insurance
Companies
Twentieth Century
Insurance

Los Padres Forest
Association

USAA Property and
Casualty Insurance

The Nature
Conservancy
National Audubon
Society

USDA Forest Service

California Sod
Producers
California State
Association of
Counties
California State
California
Automobile
Cattlemen’s
Association
Association
California Department California State Fire
of Conservation
Marshal’s Office
California State
California State
Firefighters
Association of
Association
Counties
California Department California Urban
of Fish and Game
Forests Council

National Fire
Protection
Association
Orange County Fire
Authority

California Department Chubb Insurance
of Forestry and Fire
Protection

(http://www.firesafecouncil.org/about)
Fire Safe Councils are diverse in achieving wildfire awareness. They sponsor awareness
advertising campaigns, conduct workshops, publish brochures for homeowners, plot dangerous
fire areas with Geographic Information Systems software, maintain web sites and services, and
conduct fuel reduction activities in local forested areas. Generally, members from each of the
council chapters meet monthly to discuss any fires of which they are aware, as well as news and
current events. Interestingly, out of the fifty-eight counties in California, ten have no Fire Safe
Council at all while other counties have several.
States lacking enforceable, state-level wildfire mitigation measures have also formed
outreach programs meant to convince citizens to assist with their own hands. Montana, Idaho,
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and Colorado have introduced land development codes and ordinances for subdivision design
standards. Many of these programs are funded by the same kinds of local agencies in California.
As in the case of California, some counties have several programs while others have none.
Research Questions
This research reviews the Fire Safe Councils of California. Since there is variation
among the fifty-eight counties, it is important to examine what may account for these
differences. Answers to the following research questions, designed to identify possible
socioeconomic and wildfire hazard influences, should provide valuable insight into the
conditions under which mitigation programs are more likely to take root.
- How does a county’s population influence the decision to establish county-level
programs for wildfire risk mitigation? Is population density key? How do population shifts in a
county affect mitigation decisions? What if a significant portion of a county’s population is
below the poverty line?
- How does the economy of a county shape mitigation decisions? What is the relative
influence of property taxes, per capita income, average value of housing, value of new
construction, per capita county expenditures, and non-farm employment?
- What role does education play? Specifically, how does the percentage of a county’s
population with a college degree affect the decision-making process?
- Does rate of voting play a role? Are counties with high voting turnouts for general
elections associated with county-level wildfire programs?
- How does the wildfire hazard rating affect whether or not a Fire Safe Council is
present?

11

Review of Introductory Material
This chapter has presented an overview of the U.S. wildfire problem and has described
the policy responses of the U.S. federal government and the California state and local
governments. Also, research objectives of the thesis have been described. Chapter 2 presents
research designed to assess these objectives.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED RESEARCH
Public Risk Perception
Slovik (1987), in his seminal paper, “Perception of Risk,” states that there are always
controversies and confusions involved in risk perceptions. What social science and biological
science tell us to perceive as health risks are often not seen as risky by the public. Scientists
have a relatively simple model of risk, based on probability and severity of what may occur. The
public takes many different variables into account, such as whether the proposed mitigation
technique or activity is voluntary or non-voluntary. Usually, people tend to accept risk when it is
voluntary. There are also questions of equity. Is the person who is exposed to the risk benefiting
from the activity? The answer holds major implications as to how risk is perceived by the
public.
Johnson (1993) notes in his article, “Advancing Understanding of Knowledge's Role in
Lay Risk Perception,” that in many hazard cases, probabilities are not easily judged, and in these
situations, the public can have equal knowledge with researchers or experts. Experts generally
label personal concepts and generalizations as knowledge, making it difficult for the public to
decide what is fact and what is opinion. In reality, there are several levels of both knowledge
and ignorance, and it is often the method of communication that dictates how the public
perceives risk. Thus, whoever is controlling communication has a great responsibility, because
mere knowledge is not always valuable in a hazard situation. Meaning is not inherent in
numbers and statistics, one must figure out what is meaningful for himself.
Shrader-Frechette (1990) maintains in her paper, “Perceived Risks versus Actual Risks:
Managing Hazards Through Negotiation,” that all risk is perceived. Therefore, risk should not
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be purely expert-based. What scientists refer to as “actual” risks are risk estimates which are
dependent on being measurable by probabilities and consequences. Hazards often occur when
non-quantifiable factors are present, such as nonconsensual risk, unknown risk, and risks posing
threats to civil liberties. If risks threaten health, hazardous waste facilities for example, and are
not compensable, society must decide whether they are avoidable. If the risks are unnecessary,
society can forego the benefits gained through these hazards. If the risks are not avoidable,
society must distribute the risk. This distribution should involve some form of compensation,
since harm is certain.
Hazard Perception in the Media
Rodrigue (2001) maintains in her paper, “Construction of Hazard Perception and
Activism on the Internet,” that broadcast and print media have historically distorted risk
perception dialogue between technical experts and policymakers. The author uses fires in
Malibu to illustrate her point. ‘Brady Westwater’ set up a web page to accuse Mike Davis, who
wrote a book about fires in California, of falsifying information about Malibu fires. Westwater
claimed that fires in Malibu would decrease over time because of new fire resistant materials
being used and increased access for fire trucks. In fact, Westwater was a realtor whose living
depended on selling homes in the chaparral.
Dymon and Boscoe (1996) maintain in their paper, “Newspaper Reporting in Wake of the
1995 Spring Floods in Northern California,” that the factors which make disasters memorable
distort risk perception. The authors also assert that low risks are counted as no risk too often in
U.S. reporting and that these errors lead to disasters. Following a study of national and local
California papers reporting on the 1995 Spring Floods, the authors concluded that pictures and
text do not satisfactorily communicate natural disaster information or natural hazard risk
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information to the public. Instead, they assert that information should be in the form of maps,
which they believe will give more factual information and will lead to a more geographically
aware public.
Friedman (1994) noted in her article, “The Media, Risk Assessment and Numbers,” that
major network television programs often attempt to relate environmental risk in terms of
numbers but do not explain to their audience what the numbers mean. This was evidenced in the
February 26, 1989, airing of CBS’s “60 Minutes.” The program attempted to shed light on the
danger of the Alar chemical used in the apple industry. At the time of the program, the National
Resource Defense Council and the Environmental Protection Agency was still in major
disagreement between Alar risk figures. CBS reported risk figures without knowing what they
meant, thus had no way of knowing if Alar was a threat to the public. This is a perfect example
of the media causing public outrage with no scientific basis.
Mazur (1994) suggests in his paper, “Technical Risk in the Mass Media,” that specific
media content does not drive the negative attitudes and reactions the public has toward hazards
as much as total coverage does. This becomes important in hazard reporting because, according
to Mazur, no matter how technical the reporting is, it must be transmitted beyond small press
markets.
Rodrigue, Rovai, and Place (1997) state in their paper, “Construction of the Northridge
Earthquake in Los Angeles’ English and Spanish Print Media,” that although earthquakes are
unpredictable, research points to significant social differentiation in emergency relief, emergency
recovery, and reconstruction across Los Angeles County. This differentiation, the authors cite, is
due to media patterns throughout the city. Disaster management personnel conduct emergency
recovery and reconstruction activities based on the damage maps available. These maps may be
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strongly influenced by media coverage, with the possible result that wealthier communities may
secure the majority of disaster aid. Poor communities and minority groups secure only a small
amount of media coverage.
Risk Management Failures
In his paper, “Fire Safety Regulation in Northeastern Santiago, Chile,” Cobin (2000)
notes that the frequency of major fires per capita has dramatically increased in Santiago since
major increases in building safety regulation. Fire safety regulation in Baltimore produced
strikingly similar results. An explanation of this is that stricter building codes generate a false
sense of confidence within the risk-perceiving public. Cobin maintains that public policy
alternatives are often flawed because of uncertainties relating to public choice and knowledge.
Building code policies are created before the sources of local wildfires are narrowly defined.
During the time it takes to revise the policies, fires occur. The author suggests a shift in policy to
more market-based private building and fire safety regulation. This would entail much less
regulation of building codes. The savings involved would go to fire protection elsewhere.
Wildfire Effects on the Ecosystem
In their paper, “Effects of Fire Exclusion on Tallgrass Prairie and Gallery Forest
Communities in Eastern Kansas,” Abrams and Gibson (1991) explain how succession of
multiple plant species found in gallery forests (thin bands of trees which line stream channels
and ravines) and grassland ecosystems are affected when a source of wildfire is cut off. The
prairie studied by the authors, the Konza Prairie of Kansas, showed that fire is a key regenerative
component in ecosystems, especially when large numbers of herbivores are not present. When
the United States’s increasing population eliminated many large, wild herbivores while
simultaneously adhering to the “no wildfire” policy, the stage was being set for the current
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wildfire crisis. The reduction of fires allowed for gradual colonization of the grasslands by shade
tolerant trees, ruining the ability of the prairie to sustain itself, while also reducing the net worth
of the ecosystem by choking out high-energy-yielding trees such as oak trees.
Keeley (1991) states in his paper, “Fire Management for Maximum Biodiversity of
California Chaparral,” that there are basically two types of reproducing vegetation in the
California chaparral, “fire recruiters,” which germinate in and around wildfires, and “fire
persisters,” which do not need fire to reproduce. Keeley notes that much attention both within
and outside of academic circles has been paid to the knowledge that the chaparral needs fire to
survive. Indeed some species do. A management plan for long-term stability of the California
chaparral should include biodiversity. Large wildfires are reducing biodiversity and the quality
of the ecosystem in addition to causing human losses of life and property. Through his studies of
different forests and ecosystems, Keeley maintains that for maximum health, forest management
plans should be constructed which require sections of chaparral to be burned every twenty years.
Over time, fire frequency regimes should fluctuate around this number. It is a small enough
period for fire recruiters to renew themselves and is large enough for fire persisters to sustain
themselves.
White, Waldrop, and Jones (1991) note in their paper, “Forty Years of Prescribed
Burning on the Santee Fire Plots: Effects on Understory Vegetation,” that, generally, as
prescribed burning frequency increases to a certain point, grasses in the area tend to accumulate
and grow taller. Relatively heavy burning also decreases the concentrations of woody vegetation
and shrubbery. By setting up four distinct patches of land, each of which was burned at different
intervals over an extended period, the authors asserted that winter burning ultimately reduces
hardwood sprout vigor and can introduce disturbances into the ecosystem. These disturbances
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can cause severe alterations in the area’s vegetation over extended periods. The several
vegetation types in the Santee Fire plots were all exposed to some degree of fire. The intensity,
frequency, and the season in which the fire takes place determine how plant species adapt
themselves. Differences in frequency and season of fire in the four patches of land produced
four very diverse ecosystems, thus giving land managers a wide array of choices in managing
their natural resources in a given area.
Economics of Wildfire Mitigation
In “Cost-Effective Wilderness Fire Management: A Case Study in Southern California,”
Childers and Piirto (1991) write that all of the Forest Service’s management policies and
strategies must be deemed cost-effective before they are implemented. Prescribed burns are
often used to thwart dangerous, out-of-control wildfires, but they are not always cost-effective.
In certain areas of Los Angeles County, it becomes very difficult to conduct burns, since the
forests are surrounded by expensive private property. People continue to leave the noise and
traffic of the city to build homes in and around the wildland/urban interface. The authors argue
that a cost-benefit analysis should be used by the Forest Service to reflect the “real world” more
accurately. The value of natural wildfires has been unquantifiable for a long time. We must
consider them in terms of cost in dollars. We must therefore conduct costly prescribed burns
with attention to how natural fires have occurred in the past, mimicking the natural fires as
closely as possible. An example of this would be foregoing scheduled, multiple burnings in a
chaparral area in Los Angeles County, which would be very costly if done safely considering all
of the personnel and fuelbreaks that would be required. Instead, focus in Los Angeles should be
on educating citizens about the perils of the wildland/urban interface and on enforcing California
Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291. Cost-benefit analyses should then be able to
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assess whether containing the natural fires that spring up in an area over the long run is cheaper
than prescribed burns. The authors conclude that decision trees are useful in conducting these
analyses.
In her article, “Advocates See President Bush’s Healthy Forest Initiative as a Way of
Streamlining the Environmental Review Process,” Reese (2003) explains that the program calls
for improved procedures for fuel handling and forest restoration, reduction of environmental
reviews, creation of a method to assess the risks and benefits associated with fuel handling and
restoration, development of an environmental assessment model to ensure that fuel handling and
restoration are consistent with NEPA, and restoration of fire-adapted ecosystems. Because it
would enable foresters to bypass some of the environmental review processes established by
NEPA, several elements of the initiative required Congressional approval. For example, the
president lobbied Congress to approve legislation that would authorize agencies to enter into
long-term "stewardship" contracts with private-sector organizations and communities. The
National Association of State Foresters (NASF) supports the Healthy Forest Initiative, citing it as
a way to put the National Wildfire Plan into action. This viewpoint is held in contempt by many
environmental organizations, whose members assert that the initiative will severely undermine
the goals which are set forth in NEPA. They argue that the economic benefits of increased
logging in national forests will not add up to the environmental costs of pollution, habitat loss,
and contributions to global warming.
Wildfires and Social Geography
According to Rodrigue (1993) in her paper, “Chaparral Fire Hazards and the Social
Geographies of Risk and Vulnerability,” the fire insurance industry and governmental planning
agencies must be reformed to account for equity and the efficiency of fire-fighting resources
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being compromised by hazards in which there is a strong voluntary component to risk exposure.
As suburban hillsides become populated in fire prone areas where homeowners’ associations are
powerful and well funded, the state officials must use their public outreach networks and other
tools to demonstrate how building in fire-prone areas takes fire fighting resources away from
citizens in other areas.
In his article, “Evacuation Lessons Learned in the Rodeo-Chedeski Fires,” Cook (2003)
writes that while preparation and communication at all community levels are critical during
times of drought, heavy fuel loads, and severe winds, often they are not enough. The Rodeo and
Chedeski Fires burned over 468,000 acres of Arizona brush, destroyed over 500 structures, and
forced 32,000 people from their homes in June and July of 2002. The author stresses that the
majority of the area burned was in the wildland/urban interface. He adds that such dangerous
weather conditions makes effective trimming around homes and usage of greenbelts very
difficult. Another problem presented by fires over a large geographic area is that many people
affected are vacationers and travelers. Since they do not live in the area, these people have little
knowledge of natural hazards common to the area. Informing these people about fire conditions
and evacuation routes before a state of fire emergency is reached is mandatory for preventing
large-scale confusion and disaster.
Summary of Related Research
Chapter 2 contains research from various areas concerning the global wildfire problem
which relates to the thesis objectives. The studies presented here were used as guides for
creating the methodology which follows in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS
In an attempt to gain insight into factors of variation among California Counties in
establishing Fire Safe Councils, several types of socioeconomic and hazard rating (risk) data
were gathered for statistical testing. A total of twelve independent variables were considered
according to certain requirements. Variables had to be “classic” indicators associated with
policymaking decisions, and hard data had to be available for statistical analysis. Each variable
is listed categorically in Table 2.
Data Description
All county data was collected from one of three sources: the California Institute for
County Government; the U.S. Census Bureau; or the 1997 California Fire Safe Report. The
California Institute for County Government keeps extremely detailed records which reflect
population, economic, and environmental conditions of each California County, as well as trends
within public finance, social services, public safety, and civic participation. Values for the
following variables: per capita annual property taxes, % of population below poverty line, %
voting public, value of new construction, and per capita county expenditures; were obtained from
the CICG (www.cicg.org).
The U.S. Census Bureau provides population, property value, employment, and education
data for each California County (http://quickfacts.census.gov). Census data was used to define
the following variables: population density, % population change, per capita income, average
value owner-occupied housing units, % population with college degree or higher, and number of
private non-farm establishments with paid employees.
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The 1997 California Fire Safe Report is a comprehensive wildland fire hazard assessment
for the entire state of California. It contains a mitigation legislation list, as well as methods for
fire hazard assessment and fire hazard zoning. Chapter Five of this report provides the LRA
(Bates) Weather Rating Table, which generated the hazard rating variable for each of the fiftyeight California counties. A later report containing a hazard rating for each county was not
found.
Table 2. Categories of Independent County Variables

Population

Economic

Population density

Per capita annual
property taxes

% Population
change

Per capita income

% Population
below poverty line

Avg. value of
owner- occupied
housing units

Education
% Population
with bachelor’s
degree or higher

Civic
Participation
% Voting public

Wildfire
Hazard
Hazard rating
(1-3)

Value of new
construction
Per capita county
expenditures
% Non-farm
employment
(compiled by Author)
At this point in the research, a regression analysis was not conducted, so there was no
concern about whether the several variables within the economic category would impact each
other or whether the lack of variables in other categories would impact the data analysis. The
purpose of the study was to draw from as many socioeconomic and hazard-related areas as
possible before defining the factors accounting for Fire Safe Council variation.
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Data Coding
Population density: persons per square mile (2000)
% Population change: from April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2003
% Population below poverty line: (1999)
Per capita annual property taxes: (fiscal year 1999-2000)
Per capita income: (1999)
Average value of owner-occupied housing units: (2000)
Value of new construction: value of new building permits issued in unincorporated area
per capita (2001)
Per capita county expenditures: (fiscal year 1999-2000)
Number of private non-farm establishments with paid employees: (2001)
% Population age 25+ with bachelor’s degree or higher: (2000)
% Voting public: % of residents eligible to vote who voted in the 2002 general
election
Hazard rating: hazard severity coded as 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 with 3 being most severe
(1997)
Defining Wildfire Hazards: The LRA (Bates) Weather Rating Table
While independent variables listed in the population, economic, education, and civic
participation categories have values that are relatively easy to compile using census data,
assigning a wildfire hazard rating to a county is a more selective process. The California Fire
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Safe Report (California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 1997) contains published
recommendations for fire hazard assessment under the Working Group Proposal. This proposal
was made by a team of researchers who came together from various federal, state, and local
agencies to analyze California and produce a system for assigning wildfire risk based on ranking
dangerous fire-prone areas.
The Working Group used three primary sources for gathering the data needed to compose
its rating system: Geographic Information Systems, local Ranger Unit Personnel, and local
stakeholders. The Group proceeded through the following five topics which they believed would
contribute to accurate hazard ratings for each county, after results from each were combined:
Wildfire fuel: vegetation types were assigned a fuel ranking 1, 2, or 3, 3 being most
severe, to form an overall county fuel ranking
Elevation: an intensity rating of 1-9 was used to score six categories of elevations
ranging from 0-3500 feet as a low mark and 8500+ feet as a high mark
Aspect: an intensity rating of 1-9 was used to score five categories of aspect degree
Slope: an intensity rating of 1-9 was used to score five categories of land slope degree
ranging from 0-26 as low slope and 76+ as a high degree of slope
Severe weather frequency: an intensity rating of 1-9 was used to score county land areas
in terms of susceptibility to severe weather using Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS)
(California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 1997)
A final “Severe Fire Weather” score for each county was obtained after averaging the
ranked values for each of the five fire components and rescaling them 1, 2, or 3 (1 Moderate fie
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hazard, 2 High, and 3 Very High). Some counties in the Bates Table are ranked Very High
hazard with a High rating specifically for coastal areas while other counties are ranked High
hazard with a Moderate rating specifically for coastal areas. For the purposes of this study and
for simplicity in statistical testing, counties possessing two hazard scores were assigned the
average of those two scores for their hazard rating.
Methods
The values of the twelve independent variables reflecting the socioeconomics and
wildfire hazard ratings of the fifty-eight California counties were recorded into the statistical
analysis software program, SPSS, along with a dependent variable reflecting whether each
specific county contains at least one Fire Safe Council. The approach to data analysis was threepronged, using the following tests made available by the software:
1) Difference of means comparison
2) ANOVA Oneway test
3) Pearson Correlation Matrix
The difference of means comparison identifies key influences on decisions on whether to
form a Fire Safe Council for each county. For this test, the dependent variable is used to separate
all counties into two sections: those containing at least one Fire Safe Council and those
containing none. Next, the means are taken for each of the independent variables representing
both sets of counties. Then, the means are compared to each other. Viewing the data in this way
gives insight into how locations for Fire Safe Councils are chosen. By comparing the data for
both sets of counties, similarities and differences between population, wealth, civic participation,
education, and hazard rating appear.
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The ANOVA Oneway test serves the function of a statistical significance test on the
difference of means values, indicating the independent variables that significantly differ as both
sets of counties are compared. Significant differences between mean values for a particular
variable mean that the variable in question is somehow heavily related to Fire Safe Council
formation. In essence, the variable is a factor accounting for variation in Council formation
patterns.
The purpose of the Pearson Correlation Matrix is to explore the associations or lack
thereof between the independent variables. Definite trends in demographic data exist that have
been observed over time. For example, as education level in a region rises, per capita income
usually does also. High average value of housing also corresponds to high per capita income.
High population densities often signal high county expenditures. In addition to seeing how these
indicators of education and wealth affect each other in California, assessing the impact of other
variables, such as the wildfire hazard rating, % population change, and % voting public, allows
observance of the complexities of wildfire hazard mitigation.
Review of Methodology
This chapter has laid out the steps that were taken to retrieve data which is pertinent to
the research objectives. In-depth discussion on statistical testing of the data has been provided,
and the results of these tests are presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
Results of data analysis are found in the following tables. Table 3 shows the results of
the Difference of Means Comparison with statistical significance for the independent variables
provided by the ANOVA Oneway test, and Table 4 contains the results of the Pearson
Correlation Matrix.
Table 3. Difference of Means Comparison
Independent Variables

Variable means for counties

Variable means for counties

with at least one Fire Safe

with no Fire Safe Council

Council
Population density

626.22 *

1,788.82 *

% Population change

4.61

4.95

Per capita annual property

$182.78 *

$295.11 *

Per capita income

$20,892.26

$19,071.90

% Population below poverty

14.50

16.75

$193,068

$158,820

taxes

line
Avg. value of owner-occupied
housing units

(table continued)
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% Voting public

40.78

40.30

% Population with bachelor’s

21.57

20.07

Hazard rating

2.64

2.70

Value of new construction

$1,689.14 *

$3,290.00 *

degree or higher

Per capita county expenditures $1,283.73 ***
Number of private non-farm

$2,097.50 ***

13,907.02

5,688.30

establishments with paid
employees
* indicates significance at < 0.1

(compiled by Author)

** indicates significance at < 0.05
*** indicates significance at < 0.01
Table 4. Pearson Correlation Matrix: Correlations that are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Variable 1
Population density

Variable 2
Per capita annual property

Pearson R
.455

taxes
Population density

Per capita income

.407

Population density

Avg. value of owner-occupied

.401

housing units

(table continued)
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Population density

% Population with bachelor’s

.449

degree or higher
Population density

Hazard rating

-.393

Population density

Per capita county expenditures .508

% Population change

Avg. value of owner-occupied

-.409

housing
% Population change

% Voting public

-.360

% Population change

% Population with bachelor’s

-.359

degree or higher
% Population change

Hazard rating

.457

Per capita annual property

Per capita county expenditures .911

taxes
Per capita annual property

Number of private non-farm

taxes

establishments with paid

.941

employees
Per capita income

% Population below poverty

-.779

line
Per capita income

Avg. value of owner-occupied

.921

housing

(table continued)
29

Per capita income

% Population with bachelor’s

.925

degree or higher
Per capita income

Hazard rating

-.638

% Population below poverty

Avg. value of owner-occupied

-.698

line

housing units

% Population below poverty

% Population with bachelor’s

line

degree or higher

% Population below poverty

Hazard rating

.390

Avg. value of owner-occupied

% Population with bachelor’s

.896

housing units

degree or higher

Avg. value of owner-occupied

Hazard rating

-.671

% Voting public

Value of new construction

.408

% Population with bachelor’s

Hazard rating

-.623

-.648

line

housing units

degree or higher
Per capita county expenditures Number of private non-farm

.871

establishments with paid
employees

(compiled by Author)
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The existence of Fire Safe Council local chapters is significantly associated with four of
the twelve independent variables observed in the study: population density, per capita annual
property taxes, value of new construction, and per capita county expenditures. No significant
associations were found between council formation and per capita income, % population change,
% population below poverty line, average value of owner-occupied housing units, % voting
public, % population with bachelor’s degree or higher, hazard rating, or number of private nonfarm establishments with paid employees. Only two of the five categories of independent
variables outlined in Table 2 are significantly associated with council formation: population and
economic factors. All variables concerned with education, civic participation, and wildfire
hazard level were found as having no significant impact.
One may find it particularly odd that the wildfire hazard rating of a county was found to
have no significant impact on Council formation. The Difference of Means Comparison in Table
3 shows that the hazard ratings for both sets of counties are virtually equal. Thus, whether a
Council forms must hinge on other variables. For the particular fire hazard situation in
California, these other variables correspond to low county population.
Effect of Population Density
Analysis begins at the first independent variable in the research, population density. The
difference of mean values between the two sets of counties for the population density variable is
described with a confidence interval of 0.071, meaning that there is a 7.1% or less chance that
the observable difference does not really exist. The outcome of the population density analysis
can be interpreted in a few ways. Throughout the state of California, population is nearly three
times as dense in counties having no Fire Safe Council as compared to counties having at least
one. This suggests that:
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1) Statewide, people tend to inhabit low risk areas for wildfire.
2) Densely populated urban areas are removed from wildfire risk due to an absence of
vegetation in the region.
3) The most wildfire prone areas in California are in extremely rural areas.
Fire Safe Councils being located in California’s least dense counties can be explained
because the focus of the National Fire Plan is on the wildland/urban interface. These wildland
areas are sparsely populated compared to other parts of California. Rural areas usually contain
the most sources of wildfire fuel, thus they are areas where public outreach programs are largely
beneficial. In terms of locating public outreach centers on a state-level, the members of the Fire
Safe Council are trying to move in the right direction.
Effect of Property Taxes
A statistical difference between the per capita property tax means of both sets of counties
exists. Overall, counties that have a Council have much lower property taxes. This is indicative
of a lower population for these counties, since urban property is generally worth more than rural
property. The concept of scarcity applies to property taxes; space is most valuable where it is
least available.
Analysis of the population density and per capita property taxes variables clearly shows
that the locations of Fire Safe Councils are heavily related to low county population. When
population density data and property tax data is compared with data from other variables, this
assertion is further supported.
Effect of Value of New Construction
There is a significant difference in the mean values for the value of new construction
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between the two sets of counties. Analysis indicates that less new construction is taking place in
counties with a Council. Again, this is indicative of a lower population in these counties.
Densely populated areas tend to develop at faster rates than adjacent rural areas due to the high
demands for space surrounding urban areas.
Effect of Per Capita County Expenditures
A statistical difference between the per capita county expenditures means of both sets of
counties exists. Fire Safe Councils tend to be located in counties where overall spending is
lowest. These counties are also sparsely populated. Analysis of per capita county expenditures,
the fourth variable found to significantly associate with formation of a Council and also indicate
low county populations, strengthens the assertion that Council locations are related to low county
populations more than any other single factor or combination of factors.
Pearson Correlation Matrix
The Pearson Correlation Matrix revealed several associations between variables that have
been observed over time in similar studies. This is seen as a positive, i.e., there is only a small
chance of there being large errors in the data, the data collection for this particular study, or the
analysis. Some of the positive relationships observed, where one variable increases as another
increases, are: per capita property taxes to per capita county expenditures; per capita income to
average value of owner-occupied housing; per capita income to % population with bachelor’s
degree or higher; and average value of owner-occupied housing to % population with bachelor’s
degree or higher. Some of the negative relationships observed, in which one variable decreases
as another increases, are: % population below poverty line to % population with bachelor’s
degree or higher; per capita income to % population below poverty line; and % population below
poverty line to average value of owner-occupied housing.
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There is a group of correlations which demonstrate how wildfires remain a problem in
California despite the myriad of mitigation attempts made at state and local levels. One of these
key correlations is the positive one between % population change and hazard rating. The
majority of people who change residency in California are moving into riskier, more fire-prone
areas. They are moving into the wildland/urban interface.
People tend to accept risk when it is voluntary (Slovik, 1987), so a risk manager may
surmise that the majority of people moving into riskier areas are wealthy people who are
choosing seclusion from the bustle of city life over safety from wildfires. In this scenario, a need
for space and tranquility inspires homeowners to relocate to the wildland/urban interface. Risk
management specialists have often tried to show how important it is to keep fire-prone areas
(where there is a strong voluntary component to risk exposure) from compromising the firefighting resources of other areas (Rodrigue, 1993).
The negative relationship between % population change and average value of owneroccupied housing, the positive relationship between % of population below poverty line and
hazard rating, and the negative relationship between per capita income and hazard rating dispel
the popular myth that the wildlife/urban interface is being populated mainly by wealthy
residents. The interface is being expanded mostly by people who have little choice in accepting
the risk. Putting this into context with where Fire Safe Councils tend to be found brings a sense
of clarity to California’s wildfire problem. Councils are found mainly in counties with low
populations, but eventually, development in more populated counties continues until
homeowners have little choice but to live in much riskier zones. The safety provided by fireretardant surfaces such as concrete and asphalt shrinks as areas devoid of plentiful vegetation
grow outward and come into contact with wildlands.
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Summary of Findings
This chapter indicates the factors which significantly associate with formation of a Fire
Safe Council, providing a scenario of where Councils are likely to be found. Relationships
between significant factors were explored, as well as relationships between other variables which
pointed to problems associated with the locations of Councils. These preliminary findings shed
light on the conditions under which wildfire mitigation programs are adopted. The fifth and final
chapter offers conclusions and policy recommendations based on these findings.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, only four of the twelve independent variables in the study of California were
observed to be significantly associated with a county’s decision to form a Fire Safe Council local
chapter or not. Significant associations were found only for population density, per capita annual
property taxes, value of new construction, and per capita county expenditures. These variables
represent two of the five categories of independent variables, population and economic status,
indicating that civic participation, education, and hazard rating have no detectable association or
influence on Fire Safe Council locations.
Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291
This study provides perspectives from which to assess wildfire policy in California,
especially Public Resources Code Sections 4290 and 4291. Analysis of each of the twelve
independent variables shows that the statewide wildfire hazard problems far surpass any
positives that can be brought about by enforcing defensible space around the home. The
protection offered by a strict following of 4290 and 4291 is not absolute. As large fires merge
and come into contact with optimal weather conditions, no degree of greenbelts and tree
trimming will thwart the advances (Cook, 2003). The relationships among several variables
included in the Pearson Correlation Matrix show that people are moving into riskier areas, and in
most cases, the people who are moving are not wealthy. These people may not have access to
public outreach, thus may not be educated on wildfires, and/or they may not have the resources
to take the required precautions with their home.
There is a definite need for defensible space requirements. There must be a baseline of
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security, a minimum of physical deterrents, employed by the property owner against the wildfire
threat. However, there must be additional mandated policies.
Developmental Carrying Capacity
One possible wildfire policy that should be considered in California is a form of zoning
which is closely tied to the most accurate wildfire hazard models available to decision-makers.
This program would attempt to determine the developmental “carrying capacity” for regions
within the wildland/urban interface. A question this zoning approach would seek to answer is:
“How far out can we build in the wildland/urban interface before we significantly increase
wildfire risk?” Defining “significant,” however, causes numerous problems. A program that
limits development in this way would dampen economic growth in California, and would be met
harshly by many concerned citizens. Limiting community growth limits construction of
businesses, roads, and homes. Jobs associated with these areas are highly needed in many
communities. However, this research suggests that a bold shift in policy is necessary to restrict
the extent of interface encroachment. If attention were paid to hazard models prior to
construction in the wildland/urban interface, the likelihood of wildfire disasters could be
reduced. Some of the more dangerous areas would not be inhabited. In order to compensate for
areas in which construction is not allowed, communities would be forced to implement the
principles of “smart growth,” which help prevent urban sprawl. Smart growth is a maximization
of green, open spaces in a community via efficient uses of resources, building designs (such as
taller buildings covering less ground area), and existing infrastructures (www.smartgrowth.org).
Placing Value on Hazard Analyses
The rationale for conducting large-scale hazard analyses is to produce results for regions
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(some form of hazard rating, perhaps), which serve as guides for making environmental policy
decisions. The results of this research indicate that hazard analyses are less important than
population and/or economic factors as potential influences on decision-makers’ choices for Fire
Safe Council locations. This brings up the question of whether hazard analyses are generally less
important to decision-makers than population and/or economic factors. Since the mean hazard
ratings for counties with Fire Safe Councils are similar to the means for counties lacking a
Council, it is necessary that another hazard analysis be conducted which is more precise and
accurate than the LRA (Bates) Weather Rating Table. The FARSITE model, for example, which
has more hazard level outputs (very low, low, moderate, high, very high risk, etc.) than the Bates
model, could be used to construct the county hazard ratings to see if a different hazard model
would produce different mean hazard ratings for each set of counties. Unfortunately, the
Working Group used the Bates Model exclusively in assigning each county a hazard level.
Directions for Future Research
There is much need for several kinds of environmental studies to be done across the
country, similar to the study explained herein, to see whether most hazard analyses affect policy
decisions. Much effort, manpower, and time is expended across the United States, especially in
our universities, to create the software and models used in our natural hazard analyses. Much of
the resources used in preparation of these models are subsidized by the American taxpayer.
Society needs to know the extent to which these models impact their lives and the extent they
reduce the risk of environmental hazards.
Several Western U.S. states have wildfire programs: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and
others. A valuable large-scale project would be to conduct fire hazard ratings for these states
(most states beside California lack a rating system because they do not have state-enforced
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mitigation laws). Using a multivariate analysis, the ratings could then be compared to
socioeconomic variables such as those used in this study to determine whether they have any
significant impact on the adoption of wildfire mitigation programs. For example, is the
negligible policy impact of wildfire hazard ratings confined to California, or is it a much more
common phenomenon? Similar case studies on the many U.S. environmental hazards and the
mitigation programs used to address them are topics that should be researched by scientists and
graduate students.
Summary
This study has attempted to further our understanding of the conditions under which
county officials and citizens adopt wildfire risk mitigation programs. Such insight is beneficial
not only to wildfire mitigation, but also to a variety of public policies aimed at reducing natural
hazards and protecting natural resources. It will become increasingly important to design
effective environmental policies which motivate private citizens to make positive and
meaningful changes in their behavior.
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